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“Modern cell phones [are] now such a pervasive and insistent part of 
daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were 
an important feature of human anatomy.”
—Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.1
 Before the emergence of the digital age, carrying your most sensitive and personal 
information in your pocket was not the norm.2 Today, with the digital age in full 
swing, not carrying a smartphone, or even a regular cell phone, has become the 
exception.3 Smartphones track many aspects of our daily lives: the steps we take,4 the 
calories we consume,5 the photos we snap,6 the money we spend,7 and the people we 
connect with.8
 Because of the quality and quantity of information we routinely store on our 
phones, serious individual privacy interests are implicated when law enforcement 
searches a digital device.9 This concern is heightened at the U.S. border,10 as most 
people travel with at least one digital device.11 U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP) can search all persons and merchandise crossing the border pursuant to its 
authority to enforce immigration, customs, and federal laws.12 These searches help 
1. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014).
2. Id. at 395.
3. Id. See generally Adam Fendelman, How Are Cellphones Different From Smartphones?, Lifewire (Oct. 14, 
2019), https://www.lifewire.com/cell-phones-vs-smartphones-577507 (distinguishing a cellphone from 
a smartphone, as a cellphone can make and receive phone calls and text messages while a smartphone 
can make and receive phone calls and text messages, surf the internet, and download applications).
4. See Brad Jones, 6 Things You Didn’t Realize Your iPhone is Tracking, Make Use Of (June 21, 2017), 
https://www.makeuseof.com/tag/iphone-tracking/.
5. David LaGesse, Lose Weight With Your Phone, AARP (Apr. 14, 2011), https://www.aarp.org/health/
fitness/info-04-2011/lose-weight-with-your-phone.html.
6. David Nield, All the Ways Your Smartphone and Its Apps Can Track You, Gizmodo (Sept. 12, 2019), 
https://gizmodo.com/all-the-ways-your-smartphone-and-its-apps-can-track-you-1821213704.
7. Ryan Dezember, Your Smartphone’s Location Data Is Worth Big Money to Wall Street, Wall St. J. (Nov. 2, 
2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/your-smartphones-location-data-is-worth-big-money-to-wall-
street-1541131260.
8. See Nield, supra note 6.
9. United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 966 (9th Cir. 2013).
10. Id. at 961 (noting that airports with international terminals, along with all ports of entry, are considered 
the functional equivalent of the border). 
11. United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 145 (4th Cir. 2018).
12. Privacy Impact Assessment: Update for CBP Border Searches of Electronic Devices, Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec. 1 (2018), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/f iles/publications/PIA-CBP%20-%20Border-
Searches-of-Electronic-Devices%20-January-2018%20-%20Compliant.pdf.
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detect evidence of child pornography, digital contraband,13 human trafficking, 
terrorism, and commercial crimes.14
 This Case Comment contends that the court in United States v. Touset erred when 
it held that no standard of suspicion is required to conduct forensic searches of 
electronic devices at the U.S. border.15 First, the Touset court failed to consider relevant 
precedent, including its own precedent, that held reasonable suspicion is the standard 
required at the border to uphold a forensic search of electronic devices.16 Second, the 
Touset court misapplied binding Supreme Court precedent17 when it failed to consider 
electronic devices as a new “category of effects.”18 The Touset court’s decision 
jeopardizes the privacy interests of every American who travels internationally, and 
does very little to achieve the CBP’s goals to secure the border.19
 In September 2014, Xoom, a money transmitting company, identified several 
individuals who made frequent payments to accounts located in countries known for 
sex trafficking and child pornography.20 The Xoom users utilized Yahoo! e-mail 
addresses to create their Xoom accounts,21 which prompted Xoom to alert the 
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) and Yahoo!.22 Upon 
further investigation, Yahoo! discovered that one of the e-mail accounts23 contained 
a file with child pornography.24 Yahoo! sent this information to the NCMEC, who 
then notified the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).25 DHS subpoenaed 
several money transmitting companies, including Western Union, in an effort to 
13. Digital contraband is any computer file that, outside very specific authorized exceptions, cannot be 
legally possessed. Michael Adler, Cyberspace, General Searches, and Digital Contraband: The Fourth 
Amendment and the Net-Wide Search, 105 Yale L.J. 1093, 1097 (1996).
14. Border Search of Electronic Devises, U.S. Customs and Border Prot. (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.cbp.
gov/sites/default/f iles/assets/documents/2018-Jan/CBP-Directive-3340-049A-Border-Search-of-
Electronic-Media-Compliant.pdf.
15. 890 F.3d 1227, 1231 (11th Cir. 2018).
16. United States v. Vergara, 884 F.3d 1309, 1313 (11th Cir. 2018).
17. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 402–03 (2014).
18. Touset, 890 F.3d at 1233.
19. Compare Vergara, 884 F.3d at 1317 (Pryor, J., dissenting), with Touset, 890 F.3d at 1236. The Touset 
court’s ruling sacrifices privacy protections under the Fourth Amendment with little benefit—digital 
contraband is often stored on cloud storage, backup servers, or on other devices, and thus, has the 
potential to be forever present. Touset, 890 F.3d at 1236.
20. United States v. Touset, No. 1:15-CR-45-MHC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31666, at *1–3 (N.D. Ga. 
Mar. 11, 2016). Countries known for sex trafficking and child pornography include the Philippines, 
Thailand, and the Dominican Republic. Id. at *2.
21. Id. at *2.
22. Id.
23. The e-mail account “ilovyousomuch0820@yahoo.com” was connected to defendant Touset. Id. 
24. Id. The e-mail account also listed a phone number linked to the Philippines. Id.
25. Id. The NCMEC notifies the DHS Cyber Crime Center of suspicious activity. See Reporting Crime, 
USA.Gov, https://www.usa.gov/report-crime (last visited Mar. 25, 2020).
210
UNITED STATES v. TOUSET NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 64 | 2019/20
retrieve the transactions linked to the implicated Yahoo! e-mail account.26 Western 
Union discovered that defendant Karl Touset maintained an account that listed three 
payments in amounts ranging from thirty-five to thirty-seven dollars between March 
and July 2013.27
 On December 21, 2014, Touset was stopped at the airport in Atlanta, Georgia, 
as he returned to the United States from the Netherlands.28 CBP agents searched his 
bags and electronic devices that included a camera, two iPhones, laptops, tablets, and 
external hard drives.29 A CBP agent manually searched the camera and the two 
iPhones at the scene, and when the search did not uncover anything incriminating, 
returned these devices to Touset.30 However, CBP seized the external hard drives, 
tablets, and laptops for seventeen days and sent them to an off-site DHS lab for 
further investigation.31
 DHS forensic analysts searched Touset’s seized devices and discovered child 
pornography on his laptops and external hard drives.32 Due to this discovery, DHS 
agents obtained a search warrant for Touset’s home.33 Based on the evidence obtained 
during the execution of the search warrant,34 a grand jury indicted Touset in 2015 on 
three counts associated with receiving, transporting, and possessing child 
pornography.35 Touset pleaded not guilty and filed motions to suppress the evidence36 
obtained during the search of his devices.37
 The District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division, 
denied Touset’s motions to suppress and based its holding on the 2013 case, United 
States v. Cotterman, where the court held that reasonable suspicion is required for 
forensic searches of electronic devices at the border.38 Applying this standard, the 
26. Touset, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31666, at *2 –3.
27. Id. at *3.
28. Id. at *3–4.
29. Id.
30. Id. at *4.
31. Id. at *5–6. Touset was free to leave after thirty minutes. Id. at *5.
32. Id. at *4.
33. Id. Touset was read his Miranda rights during the execution of the search warrant. Id.
34. United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1230 –31 (11th Cir. 2018). Between 2013 and 2015, Touset sent 
more than $55 thousand to the Philippines. Id. He purchased thousands of images and webcam sessions 
with underage girls. Id. Each transaction ranged from thirty-five to one hundred dollars. Id.
35. Id. at 1231. The three counts Touset was charged with were (1) knowingly receiving child pornography, 
(2) knowingly transporting and shipping child pornography, and (3) knowingly possessing a computer 
storage device containing child pornography. See id. 
36. A motion to suppress evidence is a pre-trial motion in which the defendant asks the judge to suppress 
the evidence at trial because it is inadmissible. See generally Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(c).
37. Touset, 890 F.3d at 1231.
38. 709 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 2013). The court in Cotterman defined reasonable suspicion as “a 
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” Id. 
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district court reasoned that the CBP agents had reasonable suspicion to search 
Touset’s electronic devices, and denied his motions.39 Touset appealed to the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals, which held that the Fourth Amendment does not require 
any level of suspicion before conducting a forensic search of electronic devices seized 
pursuant to a border search.40 The Eleventh Circuit held in the alternative that 
reasonable suspicion existed to support the forensic search of Touset’s electronic 
devices, should some level of suspicion have been required.41
 Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long been characterized as yielding 
“doctrinal incoherence,” and legal experts have increasingly showed renewed interest 
in the Framers’ original intent.42 In the 1967 foundational Fourth Amendment case 
Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court held that warrantless searches are generally 
unlawful, subject to only a few “specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions.”43 Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has developed to recognize border 
stops as one of the well-delineated exceptions given the high governmental interest 
in protecting the borders and enforcing U.S. law.44 The border exception rests on the 
idea that one’s expectation of privacy is lower at the border of our nation than within 
it, because a “port of entry is not a traveler’s home.”45
 Border searches are classified into two types: routine and non-routine.46 A 
routine border search is deemed reasonable because it occurs at the border and 
at 968. The assessment is made in light of the totality of the circumstances, and factors which may have 
an innocent explanation can collectively amount to reasonable suspicion. Id. 
39. Touset, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31666, at *12.
40. Touset, 890 F.3d at 1227.
41. Id. at 1237.
42. See, e.g., David E. Steinberg, The Uses and Misuses of Fourth Amendment History, 10 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 
581, 581–83 (2008) (discussing the main differences between the three common interpretations used by 
lawyers and scholars of the Fourth Amendment); Barry Friedman & Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment, 
Nat’l Const. Ctr., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/amendment/amendment-iv 
(last visited Mar. 25, 2020) (discussing the debate on the Fourth Amendment’s protection for incidents 
such as surveillance and police tactics).
43. 389 U.S. 347, 356 –67 (1967). Under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, a search warrant is generally 
required for a search to be constitutional. See generally Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990) 
(holding a warrantless search does not violate the Fourth Amendment if police reasonably believe the 
person who consented to the search had the authority to do so); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 
U.S. 543 (1976) (holding that routine checkpoints are reasonable at the border); Carroll v. United States, 
267 U.S. 132 (1925) (establishing the automobile exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment).
44. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537–38 (1985).
45. United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 506 (4th Cir. 2005).
46. The distinction between routine and non-routine border searches has turned on the level of intrusiveness. 
See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 991 F.2d 1287, 1291–92 (7th Cir. 1993) (“When a border search and 
seizure becomes nonroutine, a customs official needs reasonable suspicion to justify it.”); Montoya de 
Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 540–41 (explaining the relationships between the reasonable suspicion standard 
and the level of intrusiveness of a search). However, the Supreme Court has suggested that the 
distinction between routine and non-routine searches may no longer apply to searches of vehicles and 
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consists of only a limited intrusion.47 A non-routine border search requires reasonable 
suspicion because it varies in technique and is generally more intrusive.48 The 
Supreme Court has held that only routine border searches are granted the full extent 
of the border search exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.49 
Conversely, non-routine searches must rest on some “articulable degree of 
particularized suspicion” based on the scope of the search.50
 While the Supreme Court has yet to squarely address the narrow intersection 
between the Fourth Amendment and modern technology at the border, it has provided 
helpful guidance.51 In 2014, the Court in Riley v. California unanimously struck down 
the warrantless search of the digital information stored on a cell phone that was part 
of a search incident to an arrest.52 Further, in 2018, the Court in Carpenter v. United 
States held that the warrantless access to cell-site information, which linked the 
defendant to a series of armed robberies, violated the Fourth Amendment.53
 Lower courts have relied on the precedent set forth in Riley and Carpenter to 
address warrantless searches of electronic devices—creating a circuit split between 
the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits.54 In United States v. Kolsuz, the Fourth Circuit 
court held that the warrantless forensic analysis of the defendant’s phone was 
personal property at the border. See generally United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004) 
(finding that the complex balancing tests utilized to determine what is routine versus intrusive in the 
context of a search of a person at the border should not be extended to cover searches of vehicles at the 
border).
47. See Johnson, 991 F.2d at 1290–92.
48. Yule Kim, Cong. Research Serv., RL31826, Protecting the U.S. Perimeter: Border Searches 
Under the Fourth Amendment 10–11 (2009).
49. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538.
50. Id. at 541. In Montoya de Hernandez, the Supreme Court required reasonable suspicion for the first time 
in the border context for a defendant who was suspected of smuggling drugs in her alimentary canal. Id. 
However, searches of people and property are generally limited to the physical confines of the individual 
being searched and their items. See Riley v. California, 537 U.S. 373, 383 (2014). When a person is 
searched incident to arrest, the searches have been narrowed to the area within the arrestee’s immediate 
control for the purposes of ensuring an arrestee cannot access a weapon and preserving evidence. See 
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969).
51. See generally Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018); Riley, 573 U.S. at 373.
52. Riley, 573 U.S. at 386–87. The electronic data could not be used as a weapon to harm the officers, to 
assist in escape during arrest, or for the destruction of evidence, which have been the main reasons for 
the search incident to arrest exception. See id. at 383 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 
235 (1973)).
53. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219. Cell phones connect to radio antennas, known as cell-sites, that have 
several directional antennas dividing a covered area into sectors. Id. at 2211–12. Cell phones operate by 
scanning the environment in search of the nearest cell-site to get the strongest signal. Id. Each time a 
cell phone connects to a cell-site, it creates a time-stamped cell-site location information (CSLI) record. 
Id. The accuracy of the CSLI is determined by the size of the coverage area. Id. The smaller the coverage 
area, the more cell-sites there are and thus, greater accuracy of the CSLI. Id. Urban areas have many 
cell-sites to handle the increased use of cell phones. Id.
54. Compare United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 148 (4th Cir. 2018) (concluding that it was reasonable 
for officers to conduct a search of an electronic device based on having “at least” reasonable suspicion), 
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constitutional under the border search exception because the officers had “at least” 
reasonable suspicion for the search.55 In the Eleventh Circuit, Touset joined the 
discussion by holding—albeit incorrectly—that warrantless forensic searches of 
electronic devices at the border do not require any level of suspicion.56
 In 2019, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Cano, clarified 
Cotterman, holding that “reasonable suspicion” in the context of searching electronic 
devices at the border means that agents must reasonably suspect digital contraband 
on the device.57 Cano distinguishes manual cell phone searches at the border from 
forensic searches, holding that cell phones can be manually searched by border 
officials without reasonable suspicion, but forensic searches of cell phones require 
reasonable suspicion.58 In Cano, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals makes it clear 
that all searches of cell phones at the border must be limited in scope to searching for 
digital contraband.59
 In his appeal of the trial court’s denial of his motions, Touset argued that the 
court erred in its decision because under Riley, reasonable suspicion was required to 
forensically search his devices.60 The government argued that it did not need 
reasonable suspicion to search his devices because the search was not an invasive 
physical search.61 Further, the government argued that Riley does not apply to 
searches at the border.62 The Eleventh Circuit held that no standard of suspicion was 
required for searches of electronic devices at the border and reasoned that the search 
incident to arrest exception in Riley does not apply to border searches because 
“property and persons are different.”63 In the alternative, the court held the 
government had reasonable suspicion that Touset possessed child pornography due 
to the tips DHS received from private organizations.64 The concurring opinion in 
Touset agrees only in the judgment of the court’s alternative ruling.65 In his 
with United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1231 (11th Cir. 2018) (stating that the Fourth Amendment 
does not require any level of suspicion for searches of electronic devices at the border).
55. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 147–48. 
56. Touset, 890 F.3d at 1229.




61. Brief for Appellee at 19, United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2018) (No. 17-11561-DD). 
The government also argued that it had reasonable suspicion to search Touset in the first place. Id. 
62. See id. at 27–33. 
63. United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1234 (11th Cir. 2018). The Touset court reasoned that Supreme 
Court precedent “considers only the ‘personal indignity’ of a search, not its extensiveness . . . [and] [it] 
fail[ed] to see how the personal nature of data stored on electronic devices could trigger this kind of 
indignity when . . . precedent establishes that a suspicion-less search of a home at the border does not.” Id. 
64. Id. at 1237.
65. Id. at 1239 (Corrigan, J., concurring).
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concurrence, Judge Timothy Corrigan reasoned that because, in this instance, CBP 
had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the court did not need to reach the 
“new-found government position” that border agents do not need any justification to 
forensically search devices at the border to decide the case.66
 The Eleventh Circuit erred when it held that no reasonable suspicion was 
required to forensically search Touset’s electronic devices.67 First, the Touset court 
failed to follow relevant precedent, including its own precedent, that held reasonable 
suspicion as the standard required at the border to allow warrantless forensic searches 
of electronic devices.68 As announced by the Eleventh Circuit’s 2018 opinion in 
United States v. Vergara, the level of suspicion required at the border is reasonable 
suspicion.69 Even at the border, the nature and scope of any search must be balanced 
against the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement.70
 Not only did the Eleventh Circuit fail to adhere to its own precedent, it also 
ignored relevant Supreme Court precedent in formulating its decision.71 The Supreme 
Court has held that warrantless searches are unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment if they uncover intrusive and sensitive information.72 In 1985, the 
Court, in Montoya de Hernandez, held that reasonable suspicion was required for the 
search of the traveler’s alimentary canal as such search went beyond the scope of a 
routine border search.73 In the 2001 case, United States v. Kyllo, the Court held that 
thermal-imaging devices used to track heat emanating from within a home went 
beyond the reasonable expectation of privacy because the devices are not within 
general public use, and the information obtained would not have been accessible 
without physical intrusion into the home.74 In 2018, the Carpenter Court held the 
66. Id. at 1238–39 (Corrigan, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 1231.
68. See United States v. Vergara, 884 F.3d 1309, 1313 (11th Cir. 2018) (“[W]e need not—and do not—
address the questions whether reasonable suspicion was required for the searches or whether reasonable 
suspicion existed.”).
69. Id.
70. United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 960 (2013). See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 –22 
(1968) (establishing that the reasonableness of any specific search and seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment must be assessed in light of the particular circumstances against the standard of whether a 
person of reasonable caution is warranted in believing that the action taken was appropriate). 
71. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018) (holding that the defendant’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy was invaded when the government accessed his cell phone data); Riley 
v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014) (holding that officers must obtain a warrant to search cell 
phones); Touset, 890 F.3d at 1234 (discussing and ultimately distinguishing the instant case from other 
courts’ holdings relating to cell phone searches).
72. See, e.g., Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219; Riley, 573 U.S. at 386; United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 
(2012); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
73. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985). The Court acknowledged that some 
searches are “particularly offensive,” and thus require particularized suspicion. Id. at 542.
74. 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). In 2001, the Court recognized that “the rule we adopt must take account of 
more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development.” Id. at 36.
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warrantless access of cell-site location data violated the Fourth Amendment because 
there is a recognized reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s movement and 
location.75
 The Ninth and Fourth Circuits have held that reasonable suspicion is required 
before conducting forensic searches of electronic devices at the border.76 The Ninth 
Circuit reasoned that reasonable suspicion is required because of the “comprehensive 
and intrusive nature” of a forensic search.77 In Kolsuz, the Fourth Circuit upheld the 
constitutionality of a search of an iPhone at the border because it was based on “at 
least reasonable suspicion.”78
 There are stark differences between the nature of the data uncovered during the 
searches of Touset’s devices, and that of the searches in United States v. Jones, Carpenter, 
Riley, and Kyllo.79 In Jones and Carpenter, only Global Positioning System (GPS) or 
cell-site information, respectively, were uncovered in the challenged searches.80 In both 
cases, the Court held that warrantless disclosure of location information—whether 
through cell-site data or GPS information—violated the Fourth Amendment.81 In 
Riley, only photos and videos were taken from a cell phone—nonetheless, the Court 
held that the search violated the Fourth Amendment.82 Finally, in Kyllo, the Court 
held a search unconstitutional because it revealed the temperature emanating from the 
interior of a home.83 None of these cases uncovered nearly the same amount—or 
type—of personal and sensitive information that was uncovered in Touset—yet in all 
these cases, the Supreme Court required a warrant for the search.84
 At a minimum, reasonable suspicion should be required to search an electronic 
device because a warrantless forensic search provides access to a vast amount personal 
75. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219.
76. United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1015 (9th Cir. 2019); United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 148 
(4th Cir. 2018).
77. United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 2013). The Cotterman court analogized the 
forensic search of electronic devices to a strip search, calling it a “computer strip search” due to the 
intrusiveness and the degree of indignity that follows because of the personal and intimate details stored 
on electronic devices. Id. at 966.
78. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 148. In Cano, the court extended this reasoning to apply equally to cell phones. 
Cano, 934 F.3d at 1015. 
79. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219; Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 378–79 (2014); United States v. Jones, 
565 U.S. 400, 403–04 (2012); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34–35.
80. Jones, 565 U.S. at 403 (holding that the attachment of a GPS to the defendant’s vehicle, and subsequent 
use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movement, constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment); 
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212 (holding that the government’s acquisition of the defendant’s cell-site 
records constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment).
81. Id. at 2219; Jones, 565 U.S. at 404.
82. Riley, 573 U.S. at 403.
83. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38–39.
84. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221; Riley, 573 U.S. at 386; Jones, 565 U.S. at 404; Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
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and sensitive information.85 Thus, individuals have an expectation of privacy in their 
electronic devices because they contain such information.86 In Touset, the CBP agents 
had access to many of Touset’s devices: cell phones, a camera, two laptops, two tablets, 
and two hard drives.87 Taken together, unfettered access to these devices painted a 
near-complete—and invasive—portrait of Touset’s personal life.88
 Reasonableness has been recognized as the touchstone for warrantless searches 
under the Fourth Amendment.89 It is unreasonable to find, as Touset did, that no 
suspicion is required for the seizure and forensic search of an individual’s electronic 
devices merely because the search takes place at the border.90 Reasonable suspicion 
should be the standard applicable to forensic searches of devices at the border due to 
the intrusive nature of the search and the type of information that will inevitably be 
uncovered.91 Had the Eleventh Circuit followed relevant precedent, including its 
own, it would have recognized that reasonable suspicion was required to conduct the 
search of Touset’s electronic devices.
 The second error of the Touset court was that it misapplied precedent set forth by 
the Supreme Court in Riley. The Touset court failed to consider electronic devices as 
a different “category of effects” when determining whether the border search 
exception applies to the warrant requirement.92 Instead, the Touset court held that 
electronic devices are the same as other property under the Fourth Amendment.93
 The Supreme Court, in determining whether an existing exception to the warrant 
requirement applies to a particular “category of effects,” has held that courts must 
balance individual privacy interests against governmental interests.94 Riley categorized 
personal electronic devices as a new “category of effects” that must be considered 
when weighing individual privacy interests against government interests in 
determining whether an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement 
exists.95 In Riley, the Court reasoned that modern cell phones are a “category of 
effects,” fundamentally different than other objects traditionally subjected to a 
85. United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 952, 965–66 (9th Cir. 2013).
86. Id. at 965. Electronic devices have immense storage capabilities, and can store vast amounts of personal 
and sensitive information. Id. 
87. United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1230 (11th Cir. 2018).
88. See generally id. (detailing all of the evidence discovered on Touset at the point of entry into the United 
States).
89. See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (citing Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 
13 (1999)); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 US 33, 39 (1996); Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991); Katz 
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
90. Touset, 890 F.3d at 1233.
91. United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1015 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 968).
92. Touset, 890 F.3d at 1234.
93. Id.
94. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 391 (2014).
95. See id. at 386.
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search, and thus, cannot be fairly compared when considering the privacy interests 
implicated during a search.96 The Court provided two rationales for its 
characterization: (1) the quantitative difference due to the amount of information 
stored on electronic devices,97 and (2) the qualitative difference due to the 
pervasiveness of the search.98 The Court further reasoned that before electronic 
devices existed, privacy implications of property were limited to the physical realities 
of what was being searched.99
 A modern personal electronic device contains more sensitive information than 
what would historically—and even quite recently—have been found as the result of 
the search of an individual’s person and effects.100 Accordingly, searches of personal 
electronic devices might expose more information to the government than even an 
exhaustive search of a home,101 where privacy is “most heightened.”102 The Riley Court 
considered the nature of the devices themselves and concluded that electronic devices 
are not just another “technological convenience”103 and, because the information stored 
on a cell phone reflects the intricacies of private life, warrantless digital searches are a 
significant diminution of privacy.104 Had the Eleventh Circuit followed the reasoning 
outlined in Riley, it would have found that personal electronic devices belong in a 
different “category of effects” than other physical items when considering whether the 
Fourth Amendment’s warrant exception applies.105
 Several circuit courts have interpreted Riley in a border context.106 In the 2015 
case, United States v. Jae Shik Kim, the D.C. Circuit court held that Riley had created 
a new Fourth Amendment balancing test for the search of electronic devices at the 
border by “assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which the search intrudes upon 
an individual’s privacy, and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the 
96. See id. at 396–97.
97. Riley acknowledges the immense storage capacity on devices such as phones, laptops, and tablets. Id. at 
393–94. This includes “millions of pages of text, thousands of pictures, or hundreds of videos.” Id.
98. Id. at 375. The information stored on a device collects, in one place, data that reveals more than any 
isolated record. Id. The information stored includes photos, texts, calendar events, phone books, internet 
history, and historical location data. Id. at 393–94.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 395.
101. Id. at 396–97.
102. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212–13 (1986) (holding that expectations of privacy are the most 
heightened in the home). Riley rejected the argument that a search of cell phone data should be treated 
the same as a search of other physical items, stating, “that is like saying a ride on horseback is materially 
indistinguishable from a f light to the moon.” Riley, 573 U.S. at 393.
103. Riley, 573 U.S. at 403.
104. Id. at 393–94.
105. Id. at 398–99.
106. See, e.g., United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 146 (4th Cir. 2018); United States v. Jae Shik Kim, 103 
F. Supp. 3d 32, 55 (D.D.C. 2015).
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promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”107 In the Fourth Circuit, the court 
in Kolsuz found that Riley confirms the rationale that forensic searches of electronic 
devices should be characterized as non-routine border searches that require some 
form of individualized suspicion.108
 In Vergara—the 2018 case immediately preceding Touset—the court found that 
Riley did not apply to border searches.109 The court reasoned that the holding in 
Riley did not impact border searches because they have generally been exempt from 
the warrant and probable cause requirements under the Fourth Amendment.110 
Although bound by Vergara’s narrow interpretation of Riley, Touset misapplied the 
binding Riley precedent that electronic devices are not in the same category as other 
property, or persons, when determining whether the warrant exception applies under 
the Fourth Amendment.111 Instead, the Touset court relied on inapplicable precedent 
of physical searches at the border and thus, held that electronic device searches are 
the equivalent to other property searches under the Fourth Amendment.112
 The Touset court relied on precedent that focused on physical searches at the 
border to support its reasoning that privacy interests are not implicated during a 
forensic search of electronic devices.113 The Touset court used three factors to 
determine the intrusiveness of a search at the border: (1) the contact between the 
officer and the person being searched; (2) exposure of intimate body parts, and (3) 
the use of force.114 However, these factors do not address the totality of issues involved 
in searches of electronic devices because they are limited to the physical intrusiveness 
of a search, and not the nature of the information uncovered.115 The Touset court 
compares the forensic search of devices to other travel indignities, such as the forced 
removal of shoes, and walking through an electronic body scanner.116 But under the 
Riley framework, these physical searches are not analogous to those in Touset because 
modern electronic devices implicate privacy interests on a far greater scale.117
107. Jae Shik Kim, 103 F. Supp. 3d at 55. In Jae Shik Kim, the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence 
uncovered during a forensic search of his laptop was granted after the court held the search was 
unreasonable without any form of suspicion, and because the search was “so invasive of [the defendant’s] 
privacy and so disconnected from not only the considerations underlying the breadth of the government’s 
authority to search at the border, but also the border itself.” Id. at 59.
108. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d at 147.
109. United States v. Vergara, 884 F.3d 1309, 1312–13 (11th Cir. 2018).
110. Id.
111. United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1234 (11th Cir. 2018).
112. Id.
113. Id. (citing United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1346 (11th Cir. 1984)).
114. Touset, 890 F.3d at 1234.
115. The Touset court relies on Vega-Barvo for factors to determine intrusiveness of a search; however, the 
court does not consider the personal privacy interests that arise for the search of property when applying 
to the specific facts of Touset’s case. Id.
116. Id. at 1235.
117. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393 (2014).
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 Further, the Touset court rejected categorizing electronic devices as anything 
other than property because they store vast amounts of personal information.118 The 
Touset court’s refusal to categorize electronic devices as anything other than property 
because they are used by many people conf licts with the rationale in Riley.119 In 
Riley, the Court outlined that cell phones are a different “category of effects” because 
they are a ubiquitous and vital part of daily life and thus, require additional 
considerations when determining if the border exception to the warrant requirement 
applies.120 The single cell phone searched in Riley was a 2009 model and offered 
significantly less storage capabilities than present-day phones.121 In Touset, the search 
encompassed two iPhones, a camera, two laptops, two tablets, two hard drives, and 
thus, a correspondingly higher amount of personal data than in Riley.122 The Touset 
court’s focus on only the personal indignity of the search, and not its extensiveness,123 
directly conflicts with Riley’s rationale for distinguishing electronic devices from 
other items at the border.124
 The Eleventh Circuit hosts the world’s busiest airport, Atlanta-Hartsfield-
Jackson, which enplanes and deplanes about 104 million passengers a year.125 The 
Ninth Circuit hosts the seventh busiest airport in the world, Los Angeles International 
Airport.126 The Fourth Circuit hosts two of America’s busiest airports: Charlotte/
Douglas International Airport and Baltimore-Washington International Thurgood 
Marshall Airport.127 The circuit split on the standard of suspicion required to 
conduct forensic searches of electronic devices poses problems given the high traveler 
rates at these airports.128 The Eleventh Circuit’s decision129 not to find any standard 
of suspicion required for the forensic searches of devices at the border creates inherent 
privacy issues for U.S. citizens who travel anywhere by air, and is ineffective for 
118. Touset, 890 F.3d at 1233.
119. Id.
120. Riley, 573 U.S. at 384–85.
121. Id. at 378–79.
122. See generally Touset, 890 F.3d at 1230; Riley, 573 U.S. at 373. Computer storage capacities tend to double 
every two years. Carla Tardi, Moore’s Law Explained, Investopedia (Sept. 5, 2019), https://www.
investopedia.com/terms/m/mooreslaw.asp.
123. Touset, 890 F.3d at 1234. 
124. Riley, 573 U.S. 376.
125. CI World Releases Preliminary 2017 World Airport Traffic Rankings Passenger Traffic, Airports Council 




127. Melanie Renzulli, The 25 Busiest Airports In The United States, Trip Savvy (June 26, 2019), https://
www.tripsavvy.com/busiest-airports-in-the-usa-3301020.
128. See generally id.
129. United States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1234 (11th Cir. 2018).
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curtailing the transfer, use, and purchase of digital contraband, such as child 
pornography.130
 The information accessed during a forensic search of electronic devices is often of 
a far more sensitive, private, and thus intrusive nature, than information gleaned 
through searches of traditional physical items.131 For example, it is unlikely that a 
person would bring with them a printout of their entire internet search history, credit 
card statements, tax documents, photo albums, and personal phone books each time 
they travel.132 However, when individuals travel with their cell phones, they carry all 
of this information with them—perhaps more.133 A forensic search not only brings to 
the surface what is currently stored on the device, but can also recover past browsing 
history and restore long discarded information.134 Should other circuits decide to 
follow the Eleventh Circuit, American citizens will routinely be deprived of their 
privacy rights each time they find themselves at the U.S. border.
130. See, e.g., United States v. Vergara, 884 F.3d 1309, 1317 (11th Cir. 2018) (Pryor, J., dissenting); Touset, 
890 F.3d at 1236 (requiring reasonable suspicion for forensic device searches at the border would provide 
special protections for devices that carry digital contraband).
131. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 375 (2014).
132. Erik Sofe, What Personal Data Stays on a Phone?, Consumer Rep. (Mar. 23, 2016), https://www.
consumerreports.org/cell-phones-services/what-personal-data-stays-on-your-phone-/.
133. United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 145 (4th Cir. 2018).
134. See Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 531, 542–43 (2005).
